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The two-person, two-strategy game is
fast developing a wide empirical literature.
Of most apparent applicability to the prob-
lem of arms reduction are the prisoner’s
dilemma varieties of this game in which
mutual cooperation yields rewards for both
parties, mutual defection is detrimental to
both, and unilateral defection is most highly
rewarding to the defector but punishing to
the single cooperator. So basic are the
mixed motives in this game-for cooperating
on one hand and competing on the other-
that the game has become a basic tool for
use in studying the parameters which under-
lie cooperation and competition and for
analytical models useful in understanding
the strategy of conflict.
Without denying the usefulness of these
simple games, one may question their direct
applicability to problems of the current
arms race. There is of course the unavoid-
able question of how one may extrapolate
results based upon a mock or game situation
played between individuals in a laboratory
to a situation existing between nations
where the stakes are real and large. This
question is discussed elsewhere, and will
not be considered here (Quant, 1961; Rapo-
port, 1960). A second question, however,
is whether the simple choice presented in
these games, always between two alterna-
tives, and the trial by trial progression of
rewards and punishments contain a suffi-
ciently realistic method for bringing into
the laboratory several critical dimensions of
the arms reduction problem.
Several investigators have met this second
reservation by the construction of games
which are specific simulations of real or
imagined problems of inspection, surprise
attack, and various deterrence arrange-
ments. These simulations have generally
been constructed with the assumption that
only strategic considerations will enter into
moves and some have assumed that the an-
nihilation of the opponent is the positive
and primary goal. One simulation which is
particularly exciting because of the flexi-
bility of its assumptions and the inclusion of
numerous realistic features of political sys-
tems is the inter-nation game developed by
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Guetzkow (1957). These games are rich
simulators of the world scene and produce
intriguing insights into the possible course
of events in specific conflict situations.
In practice, these games also have a com-
mon limitation. Either they are played by
computers in which the decision rules may
be set at variance from live subjects, or they
entail so much time and so much free vari-
ation in moves that replication becomes a
difficult task.
The family of game situations presented
here is related both to the simple prisoner’s
dilemma games and to the more complex
simulations. These games are not intended
as simulations of an entire problem in all its
richness. Rather, they seem to permit a
controlled introduction of several key di-
mensions of the arms reduction problem
into game situations which are still simple
enough to permit both replication and clear
analysis of findings.
Most conflicts proceed through a series
of moves and counter-moves with each
party controlling his own moves and re-
sponding in accordance with the informa-
tion he obtains about the other party’s
moves and the intention which he attributes
to the other party. In most conflicts either
party is capable of making a move which
either increases or decreases the degree of
threat cast upon his opponent. In addition,
many conflicts move along with gradual in-
creases or decreases in the level of threat
until one party challenges the other to a
showdown. The experimental game at-
tempts to capture these features of two-
party conflicts, and, in some forms, it at-
tempts to deal with several additional fea-
tures of the present disarmament dilemma.
These include:
1. The possibility of weakening oneself
to the point at which a surprise attack
by the adversary would mean total
and immediate loss.
2. The possibility of winning by re-
allocating military resources to eco-
nomic ends.
3. The possibility of being detected in
making reconversions back to military
power.
4. The evaluation of weapons strength
in terms of interrelated systems of
weapons.
5. The dangers of accidental war.
6. The dangers of an escalation of threat-
ening moves and counter-moves.
The games presented here are selected to
illustrate the process in which complexity
is gradually (in stepwise fashion) introduced
into the experimental situation. Games B
through G will each add one characteristic
not found in the previous games. Games H
and I describe the unique-resources game
which is more than a single step beyond its
predecessors. The remaining instances are
offered to suggest more complex games
which are designed to simulate more of the
conditions inherent in the disarmament
problem. Words like weapons, economic
conversion, surprise attack, inspection and
military showdown which are used in de-
scribing the games are intended only to
make the games appear more concrete to
players and to suggest a potential area of
applicability.
The novel feature of expressing payoffs
as long-term retribution for cooperative or
competitive behavior holds a striking anal-
ogy to current international behavior. This
is an area to which data on the conditions
for resolution of the &dquo;prisoner’s dilemma&dquo;
have been widely applied. Negative retribu-
tion in the current international crisis is ex-
pressed in terms of one large and sudden
mutual loss should the players not achieve
an unknown criterion level of cooperative
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moves. The game, however, is intended as a
psychological experiment in the determinants
of choice between a competitive and a co-
operative response when both are available.
The analogy is drawn freely but it is purely
analogy and should be regarded as such.
The only direct implications to nuclear-era
international behavior contained in such
studies is their clarification of the psychol-
ogy of the above-mentioned choice.
THE EXTENDED PRISONER DILEMMA
GAME (GAME A)
In this simple game two players are each
given twenty tokens which represent re-
sources. A token has two faces, W and E,
and the side of the token facing up indi-
cates the current allocation of the resource.
W units represent military or weapon re-
sources and E units represent economic re-
sources. At the point of origin, all 20 tokens
represent weapons. In a given move, a
player may convert 1 or 2 W units to E
units, or he may reconvert 1 or 2 units back
to W units, or he may make no conversions.
Moves may be either successive or simulta-
neous but they are made in secret.
At the end of twenty trials players reveal
their terminal strength in W and E units.
Payoffs are arranged such that:
(a) Both players are punished if both
have retained full weapons strength.
(b) Both parties are rewarded if both
have converted fully (to E units).
( c ) Between these extremes, rewards will
be assigned in accordance with the number
of conversions achieved and the disparity
between one’s own weapon strength and
that of the opponent. That is, conversions
to E units will enhance one’s gains while a
disparity in W units will enhance the re-
wards of the party of greater power while
punishing the weaker party in a degree pro-
portional to the size of the disparity.
One formula for such a system of payoffs
would be:
To the more heavily armed player (1)
20 - awi + k Wl l ) ;20 - Wl  k ( Wl 2 -1 ) ;
To the less heavily armed player (2)
20 - aW2 - k Wl l ) ;0 2 (Wl 2 -1);
where a and k are positive constants
Wl = Player l’s weapon strength
W2 = Player 2’s weapon strength
(Note that if Wl = W2, rewards increase
to both in proportion to units converted.)
The use of this formula presents a feature
often considered to be generic to disarma-
ment in the nuclear age, viz., that the
dangers of disarming may be greater in the
late stages of the disarmament process than
in the early stages.
The motives for making cooperative or
competitive moves in this game match those
of the prisoner’s dilemma games. However,
the new form offers opportunity for a quan-
titative measure of a degree of cooperative-
ness or competitiveness in a player’s moves,
indicated by the number of his economic
conversions upon termination.
Obliging the player to make the decision
about this number of conversions in a series
of twenty sequential steps is intended to
represent a feature commonly found in two-
party conflicts, i.e., that payoffs frequently
occur not after the individual cooperative or
competitive act but after a series of such
acts. The logical analysis of this procedure
would be identical to that of a situation in
which players made a single decision as to
the proportion of conversions to be made.
But the psychology differs. In instances
where corrective information is totally ab-
sent, persons are still likely to change their
anticipations regarding an opponent’s be-
havior or to react to their own partial execu-
tion of a strategy.
The game offers several experimental
possibilities. For example, varying the con-
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stants in the equation offered for payoffs
changes the relative importance of economic
accumulation and military disparity.
THE RANDOM INSPECTION MODIFICATION
( GAME B)
The game is an elaboration of game A.
All that was said in the rules for game A
applies here. In addition the experimenter
will, at random intervals during the game,
reveal the W strength of both parties.
Naturally the frequency of inspection is an
important variable.
The random inspection modification is an
attempt to introduce, in controlled quanti-
ties, information about the other party’s
actions and opportunities for response to
such information prior to the game’s termi-
nal point. The modification will permit a
study of reactions to the discovery of vari-
ous absolute and relative discrepancies in
weapon strength between a player and his
adversary. It should be noted that the in-
troduction of this inspection procedure holds
no single mandate for action by players.
Rather, the prisoner’s dilemma is reiterated
in each response following an inspection. A
player weaker in W units may take the in-
spection to mean either that he must rearm
to avoid tempting his partner to defect fur-
ther in order to accrue a wider margin, or
that he can continue to disarm now that he
has assured his opponent that he is not
threatening him. The stronger player also
may be motivated to keep defecting (trying
for a greater edge) or, on the contrary, to
keep disarming, feeling safe because of his
edge. Disparities revealed by inspections
may communicate aggressive intent, fear,
caution, reassurance or invitations to recipro-
cate. The experimental dissection of these
various communicated meanings is one pos-
sible use for the game described.
THE SUDDEN DEATH TERMINATION
(GAME C)
This game is played in a manner similar
to that of game B. The added feature is
that immediately following any inspection,
initiated at random by the experimenter, if
the disparity between the W strengths of
the two players exceeds a critical value the
game will terminate immediately with all
rewards accruing to the player with greater
W strength. Critical disparity may be meas-
ured in either absolute or relative terms. In
addition it is suggested that the decision as
to whether a given disparity is or is not
critical may be a probabilistic function, the
greater the disparity the more likely that it
will be deemed critical and result in sudden
termination.
In real conflicts, exchange of information
about relative power between adversaries is
likely to include, among its possible conse-
quences, the outbreak of violent conflict.
Game C offers the situation in which the
single defector from a cooperative pattern
will gain immediate payoff at his opponent’s
expense upon the discovery of his opponent’s
weakness. This introduces a feature typical
of some two-party conflicts in which pay-
offs for cooperation depend upon sustained
cooperation while an aggressive desire for
competitive advantage may terminate the
relationship in short order.
THE PLAYER-INDUCED INSPECTION
(GAME D)
This game, like game C, entails an auto-
matic termination in favor of the player who
has greater strength (by the critical amount)
whenever such a disparity is revealed by in-
spection. However, the inspections occur
not by a random procedure external to the
players but at the request of either one of
the players. Players must pay each time
they exercise this option of calling for in-
spection. In real conflicts, an inspection of
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the relative power of the two parties may,
conceivably, be initiated either by condi-
tions independent of the players’ control or
in a call for a showdown initiated by one of
the players. Game D leaves the initiative
for revealing of comparative strength to the
players themselves.
It should be noted that the incentives for
calling an inspection again entail conflict-
ing motives. The desire for assurance in the
safety of disarming may be as important as
the desire for producing a military show-
down. On the other hand, either fear of
showing one’s weakness or a desire to hide
one’s strength will militate against the
initiative for inspection. The cost of inspec-
tion is an additional controlled variable.
THE WITHDRAWAL OPTION IN INSPECTION
SHOWDOWNS (GAME Is)
In this game inspections occur, as in game
D, upon the request of either player, again
at a cost to the initiator. In this form, how-
ever, the party not initiating the challenge
may reject the inspection at a possibly
greater cost. In such a case the inspection
does not occur.
In real conflicts the call for an inspection
which reveals relative power and which
may thereby precipitate a showdown may
sometimes by initiated by one party but de-
clined by the adversary who would prefer to
make some concession. The situation pre-
sents an excellent opportunity to observe
tacit communications and possible misinter-
pretation of intentions. Just as the motives
for initiation of inspection may be either
aggressive or cooperative, the motives for
declining may also vary. A player believing
himself to be ahead slightly and intending
to rearm may withdraw just as may a player
who fears that inspection will reveal his
weakness and result in sudden termination
in favor of his opponent. On the other
hand, since inspection offers an opportunity
to check the opponent’s strength, the same
motives operate in the opposite direction.
THE ATTACK OPTION IN CASES OF WEAPONS
DISPARITY (GAME F)
In this game the form of each previously
described game is maintained. However,
the detection of a disparity before the full
series of trials has occurred does not auto-
matically terminate the game. A showdown
with a probabilistic result must still be
initiated by either player. The player who
has detected the disparity in his favor may
elect to have the game continue. At this
point it is important to introduce a feature
which might well have been introduced in
game C but which is crucial in this game to
the maintenance of mixed motives in the
decision to attack. A disparity in one’s
favor does not mean that one automatically
wins in a showdown. Although favored by
odds in proportion to the disparity, it is
possible that one will lose in the showdown.
In any event one loses the possibility of
playing the game to a mutually advanta-
geous resolution when one’s partner seems
to be demonstrating a willingness to do this.
An unsuccessful attack which does not
terminate the game may communicate ag-
gressive designs forcing one’s partner to re-
arm to the detriment of both players. Pay-
offs may be so arranged as to increase or
decrease the desirability of risking an attack.
The separation of the attack from the in-
spection represents a feature which is im-
portant but sometimes neglected in models
which assume that an attack will follow the
revelation of certain critical disparities in
power. The conditions under which the at-
tack option is selected may be studied with
this procedure.
THE PARTIAL INSPECTION GAME
(GAME G)
This game incorporates all features of the
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previous game but modifies the nature of
an inspection so that it does not give a com-
plete statement of the power of the players.
It is possible to subdivide the resources of
the original game into two separate zones
with ten tokens in each. A player could
then, during a single move, disarm or re-
arm in one of his two separated zones. At
his own discretion, he could use one of the
five alternative moves for converting, re-
converting, or standing still in a single zone
or in both zones. This differentiation into
two zones is paralleled by an inspection
which indicates the strengths of the players
in only one zone at a time. A chance mecha-
nism will determine, separately for each
player, which zone is exposed at any given
inspection.
In this game, only imperfect comparisons
of power are possible. This compares to
certain real conflicts in which one’s own
power is known and one’s opponent’s power
is surmised from partial knowledge. The
game holds obvious possibilities for experi-
mental manipulation of inspection arrange-
ments other than the two-zone inspection
already described. It would be possible, for
example, to have five separate zones, or
even twenty, with inspection revealing the
status of a given number of such loci selected
either at random or at the discretion of the
player requesting the inspection. The pro-
cedure offers possibilities for contrasting the
relative effects of frequency vs. thorough-
ness of inspection in determining the pro-
pensity of parties to engage in open con-
flict.
Further Variations of the Stepwise
Disarmament Game
SPECIFIC UNITS AND MODES FOR CALCU-
LATING ADVANTAGE (GAME H)
The partial inspection game opens the
doorway to games of increasingly complex
strategy. Economic units and military units
in this game acquire a location which is in-
dependent of their purely quantitative con-
tribution to an individual’s economic or
military power. The division of units into
locations makes possible the use of zones in
providing not only for inspection, as in
game G, but for computation of strength as
well. For purposes of illustration we may
take the extreme case in which each of
twenty units has its unique identity, signi-
fied by a locus. This may be referred to as
a unique-resources game. In addition, we
may superimpose upon these resources a set
of zonal groupings so that the tokens, num-
bered one through twenty, are grouped in
sets of five. In this circumstance it would
be possible to modify payoffs such that a
balanced economy, one with economic units
from each zone, might be more lucrative
than an unbalanced economy with equiva-
lent numbers of tokens converted to their
economic side. The incentives for dispro-
portional conversion to economic units may
be arranged by introducing a complemen-
tary factor in the calculation of weapon
strength, i.e., the grouping of weapons into
systems. Each zonal grouping of weapons
may be conceived as a regional grouping of
nuclear weapons, delivery systems, trained
personnel, etc., such that in the calculation
of weapon strength an additional bonus is
present for each intact weapon system.
Naturally, the unique demarcation of each
resource token would permit limited trans-
ferability such that some (and only some)
deficiencies in a weapon system may be
made up from weapon units in other
regions, perhaps restricted to neighboring
regions.
UNILATERAL INSPECTION AND INSPECTION
VARIATIONS (GAME It
The differentiation into specific locations
vastly increases the number of inspection
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procedures which would be of experimental
interest. The idea of the partial peek is
basic to all of these modifications.
The possibility of varying the ratio of in-
spections to conversions in the unique-
resources modifications of the game may or
may not produce results identical to those
obtained by similar ratios in the simpler
games. It would be interesting to observe
and contrast the ways in which fragmentary
evidence of defection is treated in games
with increasingly flexible, and complicated,
possibilities for strategy.
The occurrence of inspection may be
initiated by several sources: (a) by fixed
schedule, (b) by random mechanism, (c)
by initiation of an individual player, and
(d) by agreement of the players as in the
case of the withdrawal option game. Simi-
larly, the inspection may be of a single re-
source, of a fixed number of resources, of a
zone of resources, of an entire board, or of
locations to be agreed upon by the players
themselves. It would be possible, in the
more complex games, to remove the costs
of inspections and to replace the player-
initiated inspection with one which is as
much a part of the player’s move as is his
conversion. A player might thereby inquire
as to the status of any two locations of his
opponent at each turn, gradually creating
an image of the opponent’s strength which
he would use to guide his own decisions to
disarm or to rearm. Since an opportunity
for reconversion after an inspection is always
possible, opportunities for creative games-
manship are present. Mixed motives for
and against fickle changes in resources can
be preserved by allowing unchanged eco-
nomic resources to earn interest after a
given number of trials.
LIMITED WAR, LIMITED VICTORY,
AND CONCESSIONS
A military showdown has, thus far, been
considered either successful if a critical dis-
parity is revealed or unsuccessful if it is not.
In the real world, however, if certain types
of destructive weapons are successfully con-
trolled, a graded series of outcomes of a
conflict may still be possible. The more
complex games permit such a differentiation
of outcomes following an attack. The dif-
ferentiations may be stated in terms of pay-
offs reflecting the actual size of the dis-
parity. In the specific-resource games with
partial inspections, the disparity between
the players is at best an educated guess and
the attacker faces risks in addition to any
artifactual risks which were included in the
description of game F. It is possible to
allow the attacker to retract upon the dis-
covery that his disparity is less than the
critical amount. A suitable cost for this may
be the revelation to his opponent of one or
more systems of weapons, i.e., his opponent
gains an added degree of inspection. In
addition, withdrawing an attack could re-
sult in the neutralization of certain resources
-using them up-so that a turn otherwise
used for making a conversion would be re-
quired for bringing the resource into circu-
lation again.
It is also possible to grant options to the
attacked player who may not want to see
the attack result in a possible sudden termi-
nation of the game. Since the consequence
of an attack is not known until the disparity
is tabulated, it might be possible for an at-
tacked player to offer his opponent a small
but certain gain instead of a large and un-
certain one. The gain could be in the neu-
tralization of units or in the actual ceding
of units to an adversary.
Lastly, it is possible that the attack may
be initiated not on a total basis but by one
zone of the attacker against one zone of the
opponent. Here the possibilities of escala-
tion enter and total war could result. In
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principle, the conditions which produce
escalation could be isolated and contrasted
with conditions which terminate the con-
flict.
DIRECTION OF THE RACE AND SYMMETRY
In all the forms so far described, the
game resembles a cooperative disarmament
race; both parties hold maximal military
strength at the onset and are capable of
concluding the game with less military
strength but not with more. There may be
some basis to the argument that military
capacity beyond a certain level serves no
purpose in the tabulation of military power.
Even if this were true, allocations for mili-
tary power beyond such an optimal level
may still occur as warnings of intention to
an opponent or as reassurances to the side
which is arming. If each player starts with
a random selection of half of his resource
tokens allocated as military units, the race
may proceed in both directions. The pro-
portion could vary from game to game to
permit the testing of propositions about the
conditions of onset which are most likely to
produce violence. It is equally possible to
give each player a different starting posi-
tion, e.g., one with 70 percent weapons, the
other with 50 percent.
Asymmetries, of course, need not be re-
stricted to conditions of onset. It would be
possible, for example, to offer different re-
wards to each player with one player’s re-
wards relatively higher for a military vic-
tory (or for mutual economic conversion)
than those of the opponent. One further
asymmetry might be useful in simulating
those asymmetries of power which are in-
troduced by unequal technology or general
geography in the case of real conflicts. This
could be achieved by assigning asymmetri-
cal weights to weapon systems such that
one side loses more weapon strength by
making some conversions than does the
other.
NEGOTIATION AND PRIOR ANNOUNCE-
MENT OF MOVES
In the games previously described, com-
munication has been restricted to the in-
formation implied in one’s moves, i.e., con-
verting, inspecting, challenging, or attack-
ing. The conditions under which these
moves are made were set by the original
structure of the game. This need not be the
case. It is possible to allow these conditions
to vary (1) at the discretion of a player, as
in the case where he chooses to increase the
number of conversions he is allowed by
offering in exchange increased inspection to
his opponent, or (2) by negotiation between
the players, as where several zones may be
permanently demilitarized by mutual agree-
ment. Almost all features of the game de-
scribed previously may be considered fair
possibilities for negotiation between the
parties. Frequency and thoroughness of in-
spection are prime candidates. Experimen-
tal manipulations could allow one to study
the effects of imposing certain limits on the
range of values for negotiated agreements.
Perhaps the concept of trust is basically
the notion that one’s partner will perform in
a reliable fashion after he has once given
an indication of doing so. Similarly, dis-
trust is probably more a function of unpre-
dictability than of malevolence, although
malevolence is often attributed to the part-
ner whose indications of performance are
unreliable. A simple method of expanding
the communication between players would
capture this aspect of the development,
maintenance, and breaching of trust. Players
could be permitted to announce their in-
tention of making certain conversions be-
fore actually making them. Verification by
unilaterally initiated inspection is always
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possible in the opponent’s next turn, but no
new information is gathered if confirmation
is obtained. Hence successive confirmations
should increase belief in the opponent’s an-
nouncements. The converse seems also
true. It would be interesting to observe the
proportion of accurate information neces-
sary to create trust. It is also possible to
initiate contingent promises of reciprocation
and to test propositions about the propor-
tion of times that an offer of reciprocation
must be (a) promised and (b) fulfilled for
mutual cooperation to result.
VARIATIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF VICTORY
The concept of a game, even a non-zero-
sum game in which both parties may net
gains, connotes a struggle in which one
player is designated winner, the other loser,
and there is no ambiguity in the identifica-
tion of victor and vanquished. The concept
of war, before the nuclear revolution, had
similar connotations, although instances of
a stalemate could be identified. In the
game described, the concept of winnings
earned through mutual economic conversion
is a prominent feature. But how are such
winnings received? Does a person who has
won more than his opponent feel that he
has won the game? Is the feeling the same
if he has won identical rewards for a suc-
cessful attack which has wiped out his op-
ponent’s winnings? Total victory has im-
portant psychological meaning. Even in
games it offers something like a cathartic
discharge of hostility against an opponent
whose demise is one’s sole objective. How-
ever, the costs of such satisfaction may be
prohibitive.
It is possible to use the game situation to
gain insight into the worth of the total vic-
tory feeling by manipulating payoffs and
controlling opportunities for comparison of
winnings. There is a sense in which abso-
lute victory can be declared in the case of
an economic resolution. It is possible to
allow each game to continue to a final
and absolute termination. For those games
which are not terminated by an attack which
decides the victor, the game may be termi-
nated by the achievement of a criterion
level of economic conversion; the player
first converting is judged the victor and
achieves a payoff identical with that for
military termination. The game has its
parallel in the real world where the cold
war, conceived as a fight for ideological
and economic leadership among neutral
nations, may well be &dquo;won&dquo; by the side first
rechanneling its extensive military alloca-
tion into economic and psychological fron-
tiers. Be that as it may, the game when
played for absolute victory has undergone
a change which might well be formalized
by a zero-sum game.
An absolute victory game may be con-
trasted, experimentally, with one in which
the concept of victory is meaningless for an
economic resolution, or for a military resolu-
tion, or for any resolution. Gains made
from an economic resolution may be so ar-
ranged as to be both mutual and equal.
Short of this, the rewards may be mutual
but made not comparable as to size by
artificial separation of the players. The
number of moves allowed in the game may
be extended to lengths not known to the
players to discourage the incentive to com-
petition which may result from the presence
of arbitrary deadlines.
On the other hand, it is possible to accen-
tuate the competitive aspects of economic
resolutions and to make the results of a
military showdown both equal and detri-
mental for both players. Sudden and equal
loss automatically following the detection
of a critical weapons disparity would permit
this. It is often assumed that competitive
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incentives are necessary justifications for
non-competitive moves-i.e., improve edu-
cation in order to beat the Russians. The
manipulations suggest a way of studying
the importance of such incentives in the
laboratory.
N-PARTY GAMES AND COALITIONS
Much that has been said in the literature
on small groups, on three-person games,
and on coalition formation is applicable to
an n-party variation of the stepwise dis-
armament game. The introduction of a
third player makes possible a situation in
which the balance of power is easily shifted.
One of the intriguing possibilities opened
up by the presence of the third player is the
opportunity for playing the game without
the presence of the impartial outside experi-
menter present in the two-person game. The
function of the experimenter in the non-
zero-sum game is to act as a banker who
suffers losses when both players win and
accrues savings when both lose. The three-
person game allows a participant to play
the bank; he can be hurt by a coalition be-
tween the other two. Having three simulta-
neous games, with each party a player in
two and a banker in one, would offer many
opportunities for collaboration, betrayal, re-
ciprocation, and bargaining. If the games
were not wholly separate but related by the
method of payoffs, by the limitations on
total number of inspections, or by the calcu-
lation of power advantage, an interesting
array of games varying the degree of sover-
eignty or dependency of the players could
be evolved. The same principles could be
used in games with more than three players.
The number of players, the nature of their
alliances, the asymmetries of their resources,
and the conditions for obtaining winnings
offer possibilities for reproducing analogues
of some complex problems of the cold war;
yet the moves remain simple and easily
coded and they stay within the paradigm
presented by the original two-person pris-
oner’s dilemma game.
THE NATURE OF THE PLAYER
Ambiguous and conflictful situations are
conducive to expression of those deeper
personality characteristics which are often
concealed in situations set entirely by rules
and roles. The same may be true in the
behavior of larger social organizations or
nations. The stepwise disarmament game is
not ambiguous, but it is laden with conflict.
The simple prisoner’s dilemma offers a situ-
ation with clear alternatives leading to un-
certain outcomes. Whether a given move
proves beneficial or detrimental depends
upon the opponent’s move, and anticipations
regarding the other person are a decisive
factor in decision. The stepwise disarma-
ment game magnifies the dilemma by re-
peating it in several circumstances and by
making long-term dependence upon the
partner’s behavior a factor in obtaining de-
layed rewards. The essential conflict be-
tween cooperation and competition is pres-
ent and is likely to bring out those individ-
ual characteristics which underlie a position
of enduring trust or omnipresent suspicion.
Some traits such as authoritarianism and
internationalism have already been found to
relate to performance in the simple pris-
oner’s dilemma game (Deutsch, 1960;
Lutzker, 1960). Others seem promising.
Personality characteristics, as currently
measured, are notoriously poor prognostic
indicators for group behavior. The group
behavior here, however, takes place in a
relatively simple game of strategy where
the range of behavioral alternatives is re-
stricted to several moves on each trial. The
moves reflect integrative and disintegrative
tendencies within the two-person or n-person
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group, an important group variable, and yet
are reasonably related to personality char-
acteristics like anxiety level, tolerance for
ambiguity, fear of failure, and risk prefer-
ence. Since prior work with the prisoner’s
dilemma task does show a wide range of
variability left unaccounted (after many
group conditions have been systematically
controlled) it does seem a worthwhile place
to look for specific personality predictors of
performance. The traits suggested are meas-
urable by tests already in the literature.
Interaction between such game conditions
as the degree of secrecy of one’s position or
the severity of losses involved in a military
showdown and such personal characteristics
as tolerance for ambiguity and risk prefer-
ence may be important predictors of the
propensity for competitive, sudden-death
strategies.
A Note on the Selection of Variables
for Study
No single study could feasibly include all
of the variables, and combinations of them,
described for this game. A few principles
for the selection of conditions for an experi-
ment are offered as a beginning.
The single most important guide, rele-
vance to the propositions being tested, is of
limited value in a pilot study intended to
develop a means for testing a wide range of
propositions. Another consideration, how-
ever, is that the results or conclusions ob-
tained can only be understood as well as the
task on which they were obtained is under-
stood. Trials with simpler games, compara-
ble to those two-person two-choice games
frequently studied, offer an opportunity for
comparison of findings with those obtained
on a known task. Each additional variation,
when added to a previously studied situ-
ation, has a built-in basis for comparison
with prior studies. This is of great use in
the selection of parametric weights along
which to vary conditions of the more com-
plex games. Suggestions from results in
simpler games may be a most economical
way of making correct decisions about these
parameters.
A further consideration in selecting vari-
ables is their suitability to a design offering
controls which correct for the effects of un-
wanted artifacts of the experimental situ-
ation.
A third principle for selection is present-
able only in heuristic terms. Even in a study
which is not yet at the stage of hypothesis
confirmation, certain questions are of major
relevance to the inquiry for reasons of the
curiosity of the investigator. A sample of
such questions, all potentially answerable
by these experimental games, is offered be-
low:I 1
Is the party who is disarming more or less
prone to call for an inspection than the
party who is rearming?
Does more frequent inspection lead to a
greater tendency to produce mutually bene-
ficial results?
Are players likely to yield individual ad-
vantage in order to strive for advantage
relative to the other player?
Is the desire to initiate an attack when
one detects an advantage solely a function
of the expected value of the attack?
Does the possibility of having one player
incur sudden gain at the other’s expense in-
1 The questions are answerable by use of the
game but the user should be forewarned that
the answers are meaningful only for the condi-
tions adequately sampled by the game. Literal
interpretations of the terms "attack," "disarm,"
"inspect," etc., are not warranted and analogues
suggested by the terms are indeed supplemen-
tary to interpretations of psychological behavior
in conflict situations as studied directly in the
experiment. This game approaches the larger
social problems only from the more limited,
psychological point of view.
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crease or decrease the incentives to co-
operate ?
Does infrequent and/or incomplete in-
spection decrease the deterrent value of
particular weapon disparities? If so, what
sizes or ratios of disparity prevent show-
downs with given degrees of inspection?
What are the effects of secrecy of posi-
tion upon the likelihood of violent termina-
tions in a two-party conflict?
Is frequency or thoroughness of inspec-
tion more effective in enhancing (or dis-
couraging) cooperation?
Is the decision either to arm or to disarm
affected by evidence against one’s suspicion
that an opponent is arming?
What must inspection reveal in the rela-
tive power of the two players to stop a
mutual arms buildup which has already
begun?
How would prior announcement of moves
affect the propensity for violent showdowns
( a ) with all announcements proving honest;
(b) with 20 percent of the announcements
proving false?
How does the experience with resolution
of prior conflicts affect the incidence of
violent outcomes to two-party conflicts?
How are individual propensities to initiate
(a) inspections, (b) attacks, related to such
personality characteristics as risk prefer-
ence, tolerance for ambiguity and isolation-
ism-internationalism in attitudes?
One strategy for meeting these objectives
is to start experiments with the simplest
games in the order presented. The simplest
experiment described here, game A, should
be presented alone with numerous replica-
tions to check against results obtained with
similar payoff matrices for the original pris-
oner’s dilemma game. Following this a
series of those games which add a single
feature, games B through H, might be tried
on a single population.
After completing studies of eight games,
A through H, games can be designed to
answer specific questions like those posed
above. In each variation a sufficient num-
ber of games would be played to reveal:
(a) a stable ratio of cooperative to com-
petitive resolutions;
(b) learning effects over blocks of trials;
( c) the effects of selected player char-
acteristics upon the ratio of coopera-
tive to competitive resolutions.
While it is premature to state a design to
test specific hypotheses, the authors do have
particular interest in the effects of absolute
victory, of secrecy of position, and of prior
announcement of moves upon the types of
resolutions obtained. Manipulation of these
variables would provide some opportunity
for a laboratory test of the Osgood pro-
posals for graduated reciprocation in tension
reduction.
The possibilities for analysis in any ex-
perimental series of these games are numer-
ous and several analyses will undoubtedly
be suggested by examination. One form of
analysis of apparent interest deals with the
parameters underlying game outcomes. In
most of its forms the game offers a choice
of outcomes between resolution by a sud-
den military challenge by one party and
resolution by a more gradual (economic
conversion) process. Those variations of the
game which preserve this choice of outcomes
as a dependent variable could be contrasted
to reveal the conditions which favor one
type of resolution.
While the game may be played on an
ordinary sheet of paper, game boards are
being constructed which will (a) facilitate
inspection, (b) provide immediate sum-
maries of weapons strength for players, and
( c ) permit the experimenter to reconstruct
the entire ordinal sequence of the game
from the players’ score cards. This oppor-
tunity for reconstruction of the responses
will permit analysis of intermediary re-
sponses in the course of a game.
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Summary
This article describes a method, i.e., an
experimental game, which offers opportu-
nity for control of several variables relevant
to the resolution of two-party conflicts.
The game is one which is intermediate in
complexity between intricate small-group
simulations of international conflict and
simple two-person two-choice games promi-
nent in game-theory-inspired studies of co-
operative and competitive behavior. In all
forms of the game the contradictory motives
imposed by the simpler prisoner’s dilemma
game are preserved. Mutual cooperation-
or disarmament in this case-is beneficial
to both parties. Mutual attempts to remain
more powerful than an adversary are detri-
mental to both players and unilateral at-
tempts to remain more powerful reward
only the more powerful party by permitting
exploitation of the disarmed party. A new
feature of the game is that payoffs do not
result from the outcome of a single move by
the two players but rather from an extended
sequence of cooperative or competitive
moves.
The game is built up by a graded series
of increasingly complex variations designed
to include features which frequently appear
in the course of real conflicts, whether be-
tween two persons or between nuclear
powers engaged in a cold war. Forms of in-
spection permitting comparisons of be-
havior, and calls for showdowns via contests
of power, are introduced with each new ad-
dition built upon a simpler form. In the
most complex forms such features as negoti-
ation between participants, the grouping of
weapons into systems, and the waging of
limited war are described to demonstrate
the suitability of the game as a tool for
gaining insights into the psychology of a
stepwise disarmament process. Even in
more complex forms the range of alterna-
tive moves remains simple enough to per-
mit easy scoring and replication of the pro-
cedures.
This article contains a comparison of the
game with other experimental games now
in use. It includes a complete description
of the elementary game and of an extended
series of more complex forms, with sugges-
tions regarding the possibilities which these
forms offer for manipulation of important
variables of the conflict process. Last of all,
the article suggests some criteria for selec-
tion of problems for study with this method.
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